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Abstract
 
This paper proposes a new line of attack on the conceivability argument for
mind–body property dualism, based on the causal account of properties,
according to which properties have their conditional powers essentially. It is
argued that the epistemic possibility of physical but not phenomenal dupli-
cates of actuality is identical to a metaphysical (understood as broadly logical)
possibility, but irrelevant for establishing the falsity of physicalism. The
proposed attack is in many ways inspired by a standard, broadly Kripkean









The most-discussed arguments for mental–physical property dualism in
recent years have been the so-called conceivability arguments. Recently,
the most sophisticated champion of such arguments has been David Chalm-




 Take two actual truths,









and so ‘P & ¬Q’ is conceivable. Then argue that the right kind of conceiv-
ability entails a certain kind of possibility. Then argue that the conceivabil-
ity of ‘P & ¬Q’ is the right kind to entail that kind of possibility of ‘P & ¬Q’.
Then argue that this latter possibility is the right kind of possibility to entail
that the entities figuring in P and Q, respectively, are actually distinct.
This recipe yields property dualism for: ‘the totality of physical truths’ as
a replacement for P, ‘a phenomenal truth’ as a replacement for Q, ‘primary
ideal positive conceivability’ as a replacement for ‘the right kind of conceiv-
ability’, and, finally, ‘primary possibility’ as a replacement for ‘the right kind
of possibility’. The meaning of these quoted phrases will be explained in due
course.
A more popular name for the argument is ‘the argument from the conceiv-
ability of zombies’, zombies being physical duplicates of us, conscious beings,
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but lacking any conscious experience whatsoever. So it is physicalists who
are mainly interested in showing why the argument fails since according to
physicalism a physical duplicate of the actual world is a duplicate of it in any
other respect. I will make the assumption that ‘physical’ means described/
explained by physics.
I don’t think the argument works. My motivation for this claim comes
from the fact that I happen to subscribe to a certain version of the view that
properties are to be individuated via the powers they bestow upon the
objects that possess them, which view yields – as I will try to show here – a
good reply to the conceivability argument.
In what follows, I will (1) expound the zombie argument, the replies
that have been considered so far in the literature, and why those replies
are considered unsatisfactory by the fans of the zombie argument, (2)
expound the causal account of properties that I favour, (3) explain the
way in which this account constitutes a basically Kripkean reply to the
argument and why it is better than the others, (4) discuss some worries
that arise in connection with the reply, and, finally, (5) draw, in light of
the previous points, some consequences regarding the way power essen-
tialism could cope with some objections. In other words, I will offer
both an application of the powers-based conception of properties to the
mind–body problem and, at the same time, a defence of this concep-





Let me first introduce some notions that I will use when formulating the
zombie argument and the reply.
 
Metaphysical and Ideal Conceptual Possibility
 
‘Metaphysical possibility’ will be used in the sense of broadly logical
possibility, which is the standard and traditional sense, which presupposes
a single space of worlds, interpreted predicates, and the same strength for













 come out as impossible, but also propositions
like 
 
that there is a round square
 
, and under the assumption that ‘water’ is
a rigid term, 
 
that water is not a chemical compound
 
. By ideal conceptual
possibility, on the other hand, I will mean broadly logical possibility




 knowable propositions. So, for




 knowable propositions, P will be
ideally conceptually impossible if and only if K contains a set of proposi-




 is metaphysically (i.e. broadly logically)
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impossible. So ideal conceptual possibility is the same as the set of propo-




, i.e. whose negations are not entailed by








What I will call ‘a broadly Kripkean account’ of cases when there is a gap
between ideal conceptual possibility and metaphysical possibility, i.e. a





sary, its negation is both metaphysically impossible and ideally conceptually
possible; furthermore, the ideal conceptual possibility of S is the same as the
misdescribed metaphysical possibility of some other proposition S*, distinct


























O; furthermore, the ideal conceptual
possibility of 
 






 is the same as the misdescribed metaphysical







Primary and Secondary Intensions
 
The above ideas related to ideal conceptual possibility, metaphysical
possibility, and broad Kripkeanism are nicely accounted for by Chalmers’








 aspect of the meaning of concepts. The primary




associate with that concept. For instance, the 1-intension of the term ‘water’
is thought to be represented by way of a non-rigid descriptive phrase, more
or less like ‘the transparent, odourless, colourless, drinkable liquid that falls
as rain, flows in rivers, and covers most of our planet’. The secondary intension




 aspect of the meaning of a term – the same as
the actual reference of that term. For instance, in the case of the term ‘water’,









O molecules. Ideal conceptual possibility is then understood in this paper
as truth of the 1-intension at some possible world. Metaphysical possibility
will be understood as truth of the 2-intension at some possible world. Possible
worlds will be understood as broadly logically possible worlds, and, further-





 So ideal conceptual possibility and metaphysical
possibility will be referred to by ‘1-possibility’ and ‘2-possibility’, respectively.
What I have called ‘broad Kripkeanism’ about modal illusions is then the




 necessary, ¬P is
1-possible and 2-impossible; further, the 1-possibility of ¬P implies that




 P*) such that ¬P* is 2-possible.
 






Conceivability will be regarded as a way to access the modal space reliably.
Corresponding to 1- and 2-possibility we will have 1- and 2-conceivability,





 let us mention two more dimensions of analysis for conceivabil-
ity: the ideal/non-ideal dimension and the positive/negative dimension.





can rule out that proposition. A proposition is positively conceivable iff it is
imaginable. And a proposition is negatively conceivable iff it is consistently
supposable. It is thought in the current literature on modal epistemology
that supposition is less restrictive than imagination when it comes to access-
ing the realm of modal truths. For instance, even overt contradictions and





while even things like a round square are unimaginable. Negative conceiv-
ability, however, is supposition without the derivability of a contradiction.
This being said, let us formulate the conceivability argument. For P
understood as the totality of physical truths and Q as a phenomenal truth, I
will assume that P & ¬Q is ideally and positively conceivable; I make this
assumption because the proposed reply to the argument will be based exclu-
sively on issues related to 1- and 2-conceivability and possibility – the tradi-
tionally Kripkean niche of attack on the argument.
Given that to show that some scenario is metaphysically possible is to
show that it is 2-possible, the purported anti-physicalist conclusion of the
zombie argument will have to follow from the proposition that zombies are
2-possible, i.e. that there can be a world that duplicates the 2-intension of all
the physical truths about actual objects and properties but fails to duplicate
the 2-intension of actual phenomenal truths.
The crucial point in Chalmers’ argument is, in fact, that once we accept
that zombies are 1-possible, we are driven to a disjunction of two proposi-
tions, both of which are equivalent to the falsity of physicalism. First, we
should accept the 1-possibility of zombies, if we accept their 1-conceivabil-
ity. Second, if phenomenal concepts do have distinct 1- and 2-intension,
each concept’s 1-intension can be construed as the 2-intension of some other
phenomenal concept. Then everything turns out to depend on whether the
physical truths have distinct 1- and 2-intension or not, from which we get the
following disjunction of propositions: 
(a) On the assumption of coinciding 1- and 2-intensions for P: P &
¬Q is both 1- and 2-possible, which is equivalent to physicalism
being false.
(b) On the assumption of distinct 1- and 2-intensions for P: P &
¬Q is 1-possible and 2-impossible, which is equivalent to
‘panprotopsychism’ being true, where panprotopsychism is
defined as the view according to which there are truths not
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accounted for by physical theory which collectively entail
both the physical truths and the phenomenal ones.
We can now express the argument more formally:
 
Conceivability of Zombies Argument
 
 
1. P & ¬Q is 1-conceivable. (Premise: conceivability intuition)
2. 1-conceivability of R entails 1-possibility of R. (Premise: Conceivability-
Possibility Principle)
3. P & ¬Q is 1-possible. (From 1, 2)
4. P & ¬Q is either 2-possible or not. (Tautology)
5. If P & ¬Q is 2-possible, then physicalism is false. (By definition of
‘physicalism’)
6. If P & ¬Q is 1-possible but not 2-possible, then either (a) P has distinct
1- and 2-intension but Q does not, or (b) Q has distinct such intensions
but P does not, or (c) both have distinct such intensions. (From the
assumption of compositionality of 2D semantics)
7. If P & ¬Q is 1-possible but not 2-possible and (a), then physicalism is
false and panprotopsychism is true. (By definition of ‘physicalism’ and of
‘panprotopsychism’)
8. If P & ¬Q is 1-possible but not 2-possible and (b), then physicalism is
false. (By definition of ‘physicalism’ and the assumption that the 1-
intension of a phenomenal concept is identical to the 2-intension of some
other phenomenal concept)
9. If P & ¬Q is 1-possible but not 2-possible and (c), then physicalism is
false and panprotopsychism is true. (By definition of ‘physicalism’ and
‘panprotopsychism’, and the assumption that the 1-intension of a
phenomenal concept is identical to the 2-intension of some other
phenomenal concept)
10. Physicalism is false. (From 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)










ism, which denies (or has to deny according to Chalmers) premise 2.




 is in fact an overreaction




 conceivability of zombies,
not only their ideal conceivability. Supposing we do have a conceivability




 physicalism is ruled out.
Type-B physicalism is unconvincing because there is no standard




 necessary statement S such that its
negation is primarily conceivable, but not primarily possible – what
Chalmers has called a ‘strong necessity’. There are no other examples of
strong necessities, so appeal to them in the context of the mind–body prob-
lem has no motivation other than saving physicalism.
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Chalmers is happy, as reflected by propositions 7 and 9, with the idea that
P has distinct 1- and 2-intensions, and so P & ¬Q is not 2-possible after all.
This is what I mentioned earlier as panprotopsychism – the ontological view
according to which both physical and phenomenal properties are entailed
by some more fundamental ones. An alternative name for this doctrine has




 – understood and
defended as a kind of non-standard physicalism, based on the existence of
intrinsic, categorical properties that form the supervenience base of proper-










 – is based on a supervenience base consisting of
precisely the properties that physics describes. Obviously, what I mean by
‘physicalism’ in the above argument is not the same as object physicalism,
and is roughly what Stoljar means by ‘theory physicalism’.
 
2 The Causal Account of Properties
 
The reply to the zombie argument I will shortly expound is based on the
causal account of properties I favour, which is inspired by Sydney Shoe-




 and consists of three theses.
I first define ‘conditional powers’ of properties, where causal relata are
assumed to be events, understood as ordered triples of objects, properties,
















































































































condition set, and e and c the forward-looking manifestation and the
backward-looking manifestation of F, respectively. I then state the three
theses. 
Individuation Thesis (Trans-world): Both forward-looking and back-
ward-looking conditional powers of a property F are essential to its
being instantiated. More formally:
For any property F, for the set P of all its conditional powers, and for
all manifestations M in a world W of any P(A) ∈  P, given some
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condition set A, if the members of A are instantiated at some world
W*≠ W, and some conditional power P(A) ∈  P is manifested as M* ≠
M in W*, then M* is the manifestation of a property F* ≠ F.
Identity Thesis (Intra-world): For any world W, and any two proper-
ties F and G instantiated in W, F = G iff the totality of manifestations
of F in W is identical with the totality of manifestations of G in W.
Existence Thesis ([my version of] The Eleatic Principle or Alexander’s
Dictum ): (a) If a property exists, then it has some conditional powers,
and (b) if a property is instantiated, then it is causally manifested, either
forward or backward, in all worlds in which some8 members of its
condition set are instantiated.
According to this view, conditional powers are essential to, but not exhaus-
tive of, what a property is. It is also worth emphasizing that this essentiality
rather than exhaustiveness is to be understood to entail that the Individua-
tion Thesis will sanction true statements relating a property and any subset
of its conditional powers as a posteriori and necessary, rather than a priori.
3 The Reply
First, if the Individuation Thesis is true, then zombies are impossible. In the
alleged zombie world, on the supposition (a) that phenomenal properties
are actually causally responsible for bringing about some physical effects,
namely, behaviour, the backward-looking manifestations of the latter (i.e.
its causes) are different from its actual backward-looking manifestations.
This is so because there are no phenomenal properties instantiated, and so,
contrary to the supposition, the alleged zombie world is not a behavioural
duplicate of actuality. On the supposition (b) that phenomenal properties
are at least caused in the actual world by the instantiation of some physical
properties, namely, the stimuli, the forward-looking manifestations of the
latter (i.e. its effects) are different from their actual forward-looking
manifestations. This is so because there are no phenomenal properties
instantiated, and so, contrary to the supposition, the alleged zombie world
is not a stimulus duplicate of actuality. So P & ¬Q is 2-impossible.
The question is then this: is P & ¬Q both 1- and 2- impossible, or only 2-
impossible (and 1-possible)? In other words, are zombies both a priori and
a posteriori impossible or only a posteriori impossible (and a priori possible)?
Before approaching this question let me put forward two remarks:
Remark 1: the supposition in point (b), together with the Existence
Thesis, is compatible with epiphenomenalism about phenomenal proper-
ties, since it requires only that they be part of the causal structure of
the world, not necessarily as causes, but as effects. So what we have just
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established does not beg any question against any view about the place and
role of phenomenal properties in the causal web of the world. (Contrast
with Jaegwon Kim’s version of Alexander’s Dictum, where a property does
need forward-looking manifestations in order to be ‘real’.9
Remark 2: my version of the Existence Thesis is or should be more or less
uncontroversial, unlike many other formulations. In particular, it is far from
what might be called metaphysical naturalism, the view that a property
exists insofar as it is actually causally manifested. This view is rightly
regarded as based on prejudice.10 My version of the thesis only requires that
there be possible condition sets such that a particular instantiating the
members of that set will have a causal manifestation if it also instantiates the
property.
To go back to our question, note first that the Individuation Thesis is
compatible with P & ¬Q being 1-conceivable, since, as I have mentioned,
the thesis yields statements relating properties and their causal powers as
necessary but a posteriori, and a posteriori truths, even when necessary, are
1-conceivably false. Further, according to the approach of broad Kripkean-
ism that I put forward, such statements have ideally epistemically possible
negations, i.e. their negations are 1-possible. So the answer to our question
is that P & ¬Q is 2-impossible, but 1-possible.
The 1-possibility of zombies is just what the fans of the zombie argument
are after, but note that the only way P & ¬Q could be 2-impossible but 1-
possible, if our account of properties is right, is for the 1-intension of predi-
cate terms in P and Q to involve no reference to conditional powers or
involve reference to some but not all the existing conditional powers.11 Note
further that in the zombie scenario all the members of the physical condition
set are instantiated, therefore all the actual physical manifestations are
supposed to be present there. In other words, all the properties accounted
for by physics are supposed to be instantiated, according to the conceived
scenario. But if the 1-intension of predicate terms in P and Q involves no
reference to conditional powers or involves reference to some but not all the
conditional powers, and, at the same time, it does involve reference to mani-
festations, it has to be the case that the 1-intension fails to involve reference
to at least some of those manifestations qua causal manifestations of powers.
In other words, there is a coherent interpretation according to which the
zombie world involves complete duplication of actual-world physical
regularities, but either contains no causation whatsoever or contains some
but not all causation that goes on in actuality, where causation is understood
as non-Humean, i.e. as a necessary connection. As I like to put it, according
to this understanding, the zombie world is a physical mirror image of our
world, but the mirror reflecting it is a broken one.
But how could this be the case, i.e. conceivable, since it contradicts point
(b) of the Existence Thesis? Indeed, if this is what the 1-possibility of P &
¬Q amounts to, then it seems that it is a world in which, contrary to the
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causal account, there are instantiated alien properties with no forward or
backward manifestations. However, this is too quick; there is one more
option in logical space that could account for the situation. Hume-worlds –
worlds with no causation but only mere constant conjunction of events – are
1-conceivable and 1-possible under our causal account of properties, if the
notion of a property is itself two-dimensional, with different 1-and 2-inten-
sions. Since according to the theory such Hume-worlds are 2-impossible,
this means that the 1-possibility of the zombie world is the 2-possibility of a
world either with no properties whatsoever, but only items that seem to be
properties, call them ‘schmoperties’, or a world containing such schmoperty
regions. In any of these cases not all physical properties of the actual world
are instantiated.
Where does this leave us? The metaphysical possibility of a world that
does not duplicate all the physical properties and in which there is no
phenomenal consciousness is irrelevant to the truth of physicalism. What is
relevant to physicalism is a world with the same physical properties but no
phenomenal consciousness. Of course, if the only alternative for the 1-possi-
bility of the zombie world were the 2-possibility of a world with all the
actually instantiated properties being instantiated except the phenomenal
ones, so that those instantiated properties only seemed physical, then that
world would be a world that lacked something more fundamental than what
we take to be physical in our world, therefore panprotopsychism would be
true. However, given our account of properties and what has just been
derived above, this is not [and cannot be] the case.
In sum, I deny, on the basis of the epistemic possibility of my account of
properties being true, propositions 7, 8, and 9, by putting forward an alter-
native for P’s 1- and 2-intensions to diverge. The conclusion then is: the
zombie argument fails because the 1-possibility of P &¬Q does not entail
the falsity of physicalism. Importantly, the motivation for this result is
broadly Kripkean, which means that, contrary to what Chalmers has
argued, there is a standard broadly Kripkean way to block the argument. To
my knowledge, this niche – the ‘schmoperty move’ – has not been identified
and therefore exploited so far. Indeed, in a recent article, Chalmers thinks
that the appeal to a Kripke-inspired metaphysical necessity of natural laws
does not have any impact on the zombie argument, given his assumption that
1-possible zombies are enough for the argument to work (and strong necessi-
ties are therefore needed to block it), except on a strong reading of law neces-
sitarianism, which itself presupposes ‘un-Kripkean’ (read: ‘unjustifiable by
Kripkean considerations’) strong necessities: 
Some philosophers hold that the laws of nature are metaphysically
necessary. On some views of this sort […], this necessity arises for
broadly Kripkean reasons: the reference of terms such as ‘mass’ is
fixed a posteriori to a certain very specific property, so that worlds
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with different laws do not contain mass. I think this view is implausi-
ble, but in any case it is compatible with an entailment from primary
conceivability to primary possibility. If G′ is a counternomic state-
ment […], then G′ is both primarily conceivable and primarily possi-
ble. G′ is verified by a metaphysically possible world W considered
as actual, although not by W considered as counterfactual. (Consid-
ered as counterfactual, W contains ‘schmass’, not mass.) So there are
no strong necessities here.
There is a stronger view on which the laws of every world are
exhausted by actual-world laws, applying to actual-world properties.
On this sort of view, even ‘schmass’ worlds are metaphysically impos-
sible: G′ will be primarily conceivable but not even primarily possible.
On this view, laws of nature are strong necessities. There is no reason
to accept this view, however. […] Proponents of necessary laws usually
appeal to Kripke’s necessary a posteriori for support, but the Kripkean
cases support at best the weak view in the previous paragraph.12
I want to emphasize at this point that the move is Kripkean in spirit and it
shows precisely that Chalmers’ assumption that the 1-possibility of zombies
is sufficient for the argument to prove the falsity of physicalism is not
warranted; and I don’t appeal to anything like strong necessities. Impor-
tantly, to the extent that my reply can be regarded as compatible with type-
B physicalism (see the first objection in the next section), it shows not what
type-B physicalism is currently (and wrongly!) supposed to be forced to be
committed to, but rather what type B-physicalism should be committed to,
namely, the denial of the passage from the 1-possibility of zombies to the
falsity of physicalism.13
Finally, phenomenal inversion, partial zombies (e.g. visual, but not, say,
auditory), or any abnormal (i.e. not as in the actual world) phenomenal
distribution are all 2-impossible. Then we can run the same argument as
above against all these cases: all will turn out to be 1-conceivable and 1-
possible, but their 1-possibility is irrelevant to the truth of physicalism.
4 Discussion
Let me discuss a few worries that arise in connection with the schmoperty
move against the zombie argument.
The first concerns the reliance on the Individuation Thesis, and contends
that my reply has to presuppose property dualism, so even if it is successful
against the argument, it is so in virtue of a dualistic picture that is assumed
at the outset, and so, at least, it is not usable by the physicalist. In particular,
the reason why the physical properties that are supposed to be instantiated
in the zombie world are not and cannot be the same as those instantiated in
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actuality is that the putative instantiation of some of the former is not
caused by and/or not causing the instantiation of phenomenal properties. So
the correct qualitative characterization/description of the actual world, even
that of its physical regions, requires, according to the reply, qualitative
characterization of its phenomenal regions, and this is far from how we
understand physical characterization, namely, as not having to involve
anything mental.
In reply suppose first that I do have to assume a dualist perspective from
which to deploy the analytical munitions of the powers-based account
against the zombie argument. Does this change the fact that if the powers-
based account of properties is true, the 1-possibility of zombies and, more
generally, any 1-possibility involved by property concepts according to
which properties are duplicated without their causal essence being dupli-
cated comes out as irrelevant for the intended conclusion about actual
property distinctness? I don’t think so. Supposing I have assumed property
dualism, what is the alternative starting point to this alleged dualist presup-
position if the above conclusion above regarding the 1-possibility of
zombies in particular is correct and if one wants to avoid it? The alternative
seems to be that phenomenal properties are actually completely causally
disconnected from the physical world. The alternative is disturbing twice
over: first, it is itself a dualist starting point, so it is no better than what my
starting point allegedly is; second, it is not even epistemically consistent
with either epiphenomenalism about the phenomenal – understood as the
conjunction of physical causal influence upon the phenomenal and
phenomenal causal inefficacy – or with interactionism. It is only consistent
with parallelism, that is, the view according to which in the actual world the
mental and the physical realms are independent and causally disconnected
from each other. Now, it is right that the actual truth of my account of
properties does exclude parallelism, on the condition that both physical and
phenomenal properties are actually instantiated and the reply is to work.
But all we need for the reply to the zombie argument is the epistemic possi-
bility of the account. The reply amounts to denying that premises 7, 8, and 9
exhaust the space of alternatives for the 1-possibility of zombies to be
distinct from their 2-possibility; in effect it points to an alternative such that
it makes that 1-possibility not only distinct from but also irrelevant to the 2-
possibility of zombies. Consequently, in order for the account not to have
an effect on the zombie argument it has to be a priori excluded, and that is
what the alternative, parallelist picture has to do. But that is, I think, a
question-begging way to save the zombie argument.
Second, and more importantly, I don’t think I do have to assume a dualist
picture in order for the reply to work. All that we start from is different
predicates for actual phenomenal versus physical properties, without
committing ourselves to either phenomenal/physical co-referentiality or
non-co-referentiality. Then we entertain the epistemic possibility that
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these properties be part of the causal web of the world. This entertainability
requirement, again, does not presuppose anything about the co-referential-
ity or non-co-referentiality of the predicates. Then we observe what follows
from this possibility and the powers-based conception: the irrelevance of 1-
possibility to the truth or falsity of physicalism. At no point is it forced upon
us that the requirement that properties have forward- and/or backward-
looking conditional powers essentially entail anything about their identity
or distinctness; indeed, all we know is that causal features have to be differ-
ently manifested in the conceived zombie world than they actually are, and
that can be either because some interactionist, or at least epiphenomenalist,
dualism holds actually, or because physicalism does.
The second worry about my schmoperty move concerns the obscurity of
the notion of something that seems to be a property but is not, i.e. the
obscurity of the notion of schmoperty. In reply I would first ask: in virtue of
what aren’t notions like schmass, schmelectron, or schmorality considered
obscure? Indeed, philosophers are happy to use such terms when it comes
to naming some possibly instantiated alien property that otherwise we
would prima facie be tempted to name by a rigid designator of an actually
instantiated property. Well, it is pretty clear that we use these names in
virtue of some resemblance between the property referred to by the rigid
designator that designates an actually instantiated property and the possibly
instantiated alien one. Now, the objection against the notion of a schmop-
erty could then be that resemblance among any kind of things requires
sameness of some of the things’ properties, yet in a world inhabited by
schmoperties there are, by stipulation, no properties, so we cannot make
sense, or at least not in the standard way, of schmoperties.
However, it seems to me that what is important in cases when we intro-
duce a new term, like ‘twater’, in order to accommodate the intuition that
what is picked out by it is not water, but resembles it, or like ‘schmelectron’,
in order to accommodate the intuition that what is picked out by it is not
electron, but resembles it, is either a theoretical role, as in the latter case, or
a folk functional role, as in the former, which is played by the possible
entities under scrutiny. There is, however, no determinate commitment at
this point to whether the fillers of these roles are fillers in virtue of shared
properties, or in virtue of shared tropes, or in virtue of belonging to the
same set of particulars. What is important is that those possibilia do play the
role. The same thing is therefore important in the case of calling something
a ‘schmoperty’ in the context of the causally based essentialism about
properties: it is a possibile that plays the/a14 theoretical property role, where
the theory in question is ontology. What the propounder of the causal
essentialist approach to properties adds to this is that the notion of property
role that she is working with is such that the relation between ‘property’ and
‘property role’ comes out as a priori and contingent, while that between
‘property’ and ‘having such and such conditional causal powers’ comes out
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as a posteriori and necessary. Of course, the notion of a theoretical role does
not have to imply that of a causal role, the causal role being one of the ways
to realize a theoretical role.
However, the objection can be pushed further. Even if we accept that the
idea of schmoperties is intelligible by appeal to sameness of theoretical
ontological role, the problem of intelligibility reappears at the level of terms
for schmoperties as qualified by some adjective; for instance, we can only
make sense of the 1-possibility of zombies in terms of instantiation of
schmoperties rather than properties if schmoperties can be qualified by the
adjective ‘physical’, or at least by ‘schmysical’, just as a requirement for
making sense of some property being schmysical rather than physical is that
the schmysical property be qualified as seeming (to be) physical (as, indeed,
Stoljar’s object physicalism and Chalmers’ panprotopsychism appear to
require). The above construal appealing to theoretical role can safely be
extended to this level: what accounts for the qualification ‘schmysical’ is,
again, a theoretical physical role, which is not necessarily a causal role.
Indeed, on one version of object physicalism/panprotopsychism, intrinsic
categorical essences of properties described by physical theory – Stoljar’s
object physical properties, Chalmers’ protophenomenal ones – ground (i.e.
are necessary for) these latter properties’ causal activity. If this is so, then it
follows that we can make sense of a theoretical role of theory-physical
properties without appeal to causation, and sameness of that theoretical
role across possible worlds ensures the intelligibility of something that
seems physical but is not, i.e. of something that is schmysical. I don’t see
then why we should not understand the required schmysicalness of schmop-
erties in exactly the same way. Schmysical schmoperties are then some items
that satisfy the theoretical role of physical properties, but are neither
physical nor properties.15
The third objection concerns the fact that there are properties that we
conceive of in no other way than as intrinsic, non-dispositional – contrary to
how the causal account requires us to conceive of them. I take it that
conceiving of them in this fashion does not entail that they don’t have condi-
tional powers. What is entailed is perhaps that we don’t have the intuition
of the essentiality of powers to these properties. But the Individuation
Thesis and broad Kripkeanism accommodate this fact: the former does not
require more than conditional powers as a posteriori necessarily connected
to the properties they are conditional powers of,16 while the latter explains
why we have a counter-intuition regarding this necessary connection. If the
objection worked, it would work for ‘water is H2O’ as well: it would say that
we do not have an intuition of essentiality of H2O to water since we conceive
of water without reference to what actually composes it. The reply will be,
of course, that conceiving of water that way explains the intuition against
necessity or essentiality by way of a metaphysical possibility that is being
misdescribed as the possibility of water not being H2O.
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A fourth objection concerns what might be called ‘the substance of
physicalism’ as opposed to the particular argument discussed here, the one
from the conceivability of zombies.17 It says that even if we accept the
argument presented here, given that the causal theory of properties does
not distinguish between the case in which zombie worlds are impossible
because physicalism is true and the case in which they are impossible
because necessitarian dualism (where mental and physical properties are
distinct but necessarily connected) is true, the substance of the physicalism
issue is not really addressed. In reply, I would point out, first, that our argu-
ment at least has weakened the case for the conceivability-based arguments
against physicalism, and, second, that we have found a new way in which
physicalism could be true, which is useful in the actual context, where
physicalists are mostly required to defend the coherence of their view rather
than to offer positive arguments for it. Third, there is indeed an important
point made in this objection, namely, that for all the argument has proven,
the substance of the issue of the truth or otherwise of physicalism either is
and is going to remain a deep and inaccessible one, or, on the contrary,
there is a flavour of unsubstantiveness to it. Both these further strategies
are, in my view, perfectly viable to pursue, but I will leave them for another
occasion.
5 Conclusion
I have tried to show in this paper that even the most sophisticated analysis
of the zombie argument, namely, the one based on two-dimensional seman-
tics, fails to exhaust the logical space of possible replies. The reply I have
proposed is based on the causal account of properties, which generates
necessitarianism about laws and causation. A growing number of philoso-
phers have recently expressed their sympathy for either the causal account
or law and causation necessitarianism. There is, of course, disagreement
about whether necessitarianism is warranted, but at least it is a coherent
view, therefore it has to be taken into account, with all its implications, even
in the context of the mind–body problem. If I was right in this paper, the
causal account of properties raises a genuine challenge to conceivability-
based arguments against physicalism.
Bilkent University, Turkey
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Wilson, Laurie Paul, Jonathan Schaffer, Robert Adams, Alex Byrne, Christopher
Hill and two anonymous referees of this journal for valuable feedback.
POWERS AND THE MIND–BODY PROBLEM
71
1 ‘The Two-dimensional Argument against Materialism’, in B. McLaughlin and A.
Beckermann (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, forthcoming); ‘Consciousness and its Place in Nature’
in S. Stich and T. Warfield (eds) The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).
2 See Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1980 [1972]), pp. 35–6, and Sydney Shoemaker, ‘Causal and Metaphysical
Necessity’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79 (1) (March 1998), p. 60.
3 As in Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual
Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 70.
4 ‘Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?’, in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds)
Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) sections
1 and 2.
5 Or at least as it is defined by Chalmers in his ‘Consciousness and its Place in
Nature’.
6 ‘Two Conceptions of the Physical’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
62 (2) (March 2001), pp. 253–81.
7 ‘Causal and Metaphysical Necessity’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79(1)
(March 1998), pp. 59–77.
8 As pointed out by a referee, point (b) of the Existence Thesis appears to be, at
first sight, slightly at odds with the Individuation Thesis. But the reference to
some of the members of the condition set in the former versus the reference to
all of them in the latter makes the difference. What the former says is that by
varying the number of properties that are instantiated, which are members of the
condition set, one does not fail to have the relevant property instantiated. For
example, suppose that there are two actual conditions for a billiard ball with
certain properties to have caused another one to move with a certain velocity:
that the billiard table was straight and that the ball hit the other one in the
middle. There is no reason to think that in a world where the table is not straight,
or in one in which the ball does not hit the other one exactly in the middle, the
property of the second ball moving with the same velocity is not instantiated. By
contrast, what the Individuation Thesis asserts is that in worlds in which all the
members of the condition set are instantiated, i.e. when we don’t vary the
number of the instantiated members of the condition set, the property we focus
on must have the same causes and effects from one world to another. To use our
billiards example: in all worlds that share with actuality the two conditions –
straight table and the angle of impact – the effects and the causes of the billiard
ball with its actual features must be the same from one world to another.
9 Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 348.
10 Alex Oliver, ‘The Metaphysics of Properties’, Mind, 105 (417) (January 1996),
pp. 1–80, p. 8.
11 The latter – when the 1-intension of P and Q involves reference to some but not
all the conditional powers – would be the case if one wanted, in the imagined
world, to keep everything free of causal gaps except regions where phenomenal
properties are supposed to be instantiated.
12 ‘Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?’, p. 190.
13 A corollary is that according to what type-B physicalism should be, zombies are
not 2-conceivable. This means that there really is an a priori element even to a
posteriori physicalism. This shouldn’t be surprising at all in light of what I have
been calling broad Kripkeanism, because according to it the necessity bit of all
standard Kripkean examples of a posteriori necessity stems from a priori neces-
sity at the level of propositions, the aposteriority bit stemming from the linguistic
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
72
representation of the truths embodied by those propositions. For example, the
necessity of ‘water is H2O’ on the assumption of rigid designation stems from
the necessity of the proposition H2O is H2O, while its aposteriority stems from
the descriptions associated with the terms ‘water’ and ‘H2O’. Frank Jackson has
pointed out to me that he has recently independently arrived at basically the
same idea about what a posteriori physicalism should be committed to. See his
‘On Ensuring that Physicalism is not a Dual Attribute Theory in Sheep’s
Clothing’, Philosophical Studies, 131 (1) (October 2006), pp. 227–49, where he
argues that the aposteriority bit in a posteriori physicalism cannot be de re (about
properties), but only de dicto (about predicates), on pain of an unwanted
commitment to necessitarian attribute dualism.
14 Indeed, there are various alternative ontologies, and therefore theoretical
property roles, as pointed out e.g., by David K. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 55. For more about the idea of property role see
Oliver, ‘The Metaphysics of Properties’, pp. 14–20.
15 Alternatively, one could speak in terms of physical schmoperties, if one
subscribes to the Russellian line of thought according to which causation is not a
notion that physics needs at all, so that Humean constant conjunction is enough
for an entity to qualify as physical. Anyhow, this doesn’t change the fact that if
the causal essentialist metaphysics of properties is true, these are only schmop-
erties rather than properties, so the reply to the zombie argument still works.
16 This is, broadly speaking, because the causal account is 1-conceivably false even
if actually (and necessarily true). It also explains why we can stick, after running
the argument, with the acceptance of the 1-conceivability of zombies.
17 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
